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Introduction
An occupational license is a credential that governments require practitioners to
obtain to work in certain occupations (Nunn 2016). Occupational licensing laws require
workers to submit verification of training, testing, education, and pay associated fees
prior to beginning a job in their chosen field. When implemented appropriately, the statemandated testing, training, and educational requirements of occupational licensure
mitigate potentially harmful health and safety risks for the public. In some professions,
improper practice results in serious harm to the public. Occupational licensing reduces
the number of unqualified individuals offering their services in that profession, thus
increasing overall public safety and welfare. However, because licensing laws are often
established independently by each state government, significant differences and
disparities in licensing requirements exist across states.
Occupational licensing has grown drastically over the past fifty years, which has
led to a greater share of American workers needing a license to work. Accounting for
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just five percent of the labor market in the 1950’s, licensed workers now make up more
than 25 percent of all employed Americans (U.S Treasury Office 2015). Of the 800
occupations listed by the Bureau of Labor statistics, 284 are licensed by at least one
state (Carpenter, et. al 2017). The percentage of workers needing licensure varies
substantially by occupation. Legal, education, and healthcare occupations license
workers at particularly high rates (see figure 1). Over fifty percent of workers are
licensed in each of these industries.

Source: Current Population Survey, 2016

Labor market economists argue that the growth in licensing has led to a structure
of varying requirements across states, making it challenging for workers to move their
skills across state lines, and costly for them to work in a licensed profession. Overly
burdensome licensing requirements can create barriers to employment for individuals
who may not actually pose a serious risk. Most economists also agree that occupational
licensing results in higher wages for licensed workers, which in turn increases consumer
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costs. “In occupational licensing, the prevalent costs are increased prices to consumers
for goods and services and lost job opportunities for aspiring workers,” noted The
Council on Licensing Enforcement and Regulation. (Carpenter and McGrath, 2015).
Higher wages benefit licensed workers, but wage disparity can lead to inefficiency and
unfairness, including reducing employment opportunities and depressing wages for
excluded workers, reducing workers’ mobility across state lines, and increasing costs for
consumers.
University of Minnesota economics professor Morris Kleiner asserts that the
growth of occupational licensing is restricting labor markets, innovation, and worker
mobility resulting in 2.85 million fewer jobs nationally, with an annual cost to consumers
of $203 billion” (Kleiner 2015). Licensing requirements such as fees, exams, and
education requirements often drive away potential workers, especially those for whom
the costs of licensure are too high. By imposing requirements on people seeking to
enter licensed professions licensing reduces employment in the licensed occupation
and hence competition, driving up the price of goods and services for consumers (U.S
Treasury Office 2015).
Furthermore, occupational licensing laws across states can impede the ability of
workers to relocate across state lines. This disproportionately impacts employment
opportunities for individuals that move from the job market in one state to another –
such as long-term unemployed and otherwise dislocated workers seeking new
opportunities, or members of the military and their families who are regularly moved to
new places in their service to the country.
For this particular analysis, I am interested in studying how the presence of
licensing affects wages and employment levels at the state and occupation levels. Does
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an occupation becoming licensed in one state affect wages and employment in ways
that do not affect states without a license? Studying states is critical because licensing
authorities are primarily state boards rather than national or local entities. The research
and the traditional labor market theory around licensing both suggest that wages will
increase and employment growth will decrease for states that license a certain
occupation. I hypothesize that the same will be true in this analysis.

Literature Review
The significant body of research around occupational licensing focuses on how
licensing impacts employment, wages, prices, quality, health and safety, and
geographic mobility. Some of these licensing effects are widely accepted as fact, while
others do not have the body of evidence to suggest that a significant effect exists.
Employment and Wages
Although estimating employment effects is challenging considering the available
data, there is evidence to suggest that occupational licensing restricts the supply of
workers in licensed professions. Kleiner (2006) finds that from 1990-2000 employment
growth rates are higher in unlicensed states compared to those in licensed states for
particular occupations. Additionally, he compares growth rates in occupations with
differing levels of licensing (licensed in all states, some but not all, not licensed in any
state). He again finds evidence to suggest that licensing slows employment growth.
State licensing laws that require English proficiency exams restrict the number of
Vietnamese-American manicurists, as well as the overall number of manicurists
according to Federman et al. (2006). Kuo (2013) finds that states with the least
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restrictive requirements for nurse practitioners have more licensed nurse practitioners
than the most restrictive states. In addition, research from Carol and Gaston (2013)
finds that state licensing laws for electricians, which require passing an exam or meeting
experience requirements, resulted in fewer per capita electricians.
Evidence also points to a wage gap between licensed and unlicensed workers.
The majority of these studies agree that the wage premium is somewhere between
1020 percent. Thorton and Timmons (2010) find that licensing barbers increases wages
by 11-22 percent compared to the unlicensed worker with the same education level.
These authors also examined massage therapists where they found a wage premium of
16 percent. Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017) obtain a representative sample from all fifty
states and perform a cross sectional analysis of licensing effects for individual states.
They find licensing results in 10-15 percent wage increase for licensed workers. This
work built off of an initial study which also suggests that licensing increases wages by
10-15 percent (Kleiner and Kruger 2013)
It should be noted that this research does not distinguish between wage gains for
licensed practitioners and wage losses for the unlicensed who are shut out of the
occupation. Additionally, because licensed workers generally have more training and
education than unlicensed workers, and may differ in other ways, these wage premiums
might reflect fundamental differences across workers rather than being a result of
licensing regulations. Controlling for individuals within the occupation helps solve this
issue. When controlling for the unobservable characteristics of individuals and
occupations, the research suggests a more modest wage premium and often no effect
at all. Gittleman, Kleiner and Klee (2015) find that licensed workers receive 8.4 percent
percent higher wages when controlling for detailed occupation. Previously Gittleman
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and Kleiner (2013) found that moving to a licensed occupation from an unlicensed
occupation resulted in no wage gain. Likewise, Klee (2013) finds little evidence to
suggest the presence of a licensing wage gain, and even finds that more stringent
licensing regulations can sometimes result in a wage loss for licensed workers.

Prices
While the research on wages and data seem to slightly differ in terms of results,
licensing’s effect on prices is fairly predictable according to numerous studies. Kleiner
and Kudrie (2000), Liang and Ogur (1987), Conrad and Sheldon (1982), and Shepard
(1978) all study how stricter licensing requirements result in higher prices for dental
services. Each study focuses on a different requirement such as difficulty of the dental
exam, levels of licensing reciprocity or endorsement ability, and restrictions on number
of dental hygienists. All of these studies report a price premium for states with the
stricter licensing policies with the impact ranging from 3-7 percent. Kleiner et al. (2014)
also studies nursing and reports a price increase of 6 percent for medium levels of
regulation and 16 percent for high levels of regulation among nurses. Branching out of
the medical field, Kleiner and Todd (2009) study mortgage brokers and find that
requiring additional bonding results in 5.4 percent higher prices for mortgage services,
but that increasing other licensing requirements shows no effect.
Quality, Health and Safety
The primary purpose for licensing an occupation is to ensure safety for
consumers, and increase the quality of the good or services provided. A range of
studies examine the question of whether or not licensing achieves this aim which would

Page|8

be expected if the industry is being limited to those deemed highly qualified. Larsen
(2015), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), Angrist and Guryan (2007), Kane and
Staiger (2005), and Kleiner and Petree (1988) all examine teachers in efforts to
determine licensing’s impact on quality of services provided. Teacher qualifications and
student test scores are the primary means for measuring quality. Out of all of these
studies, only one found that licensing had a significant effect on quality of teaching
services provided. Larsen (2015) finds when measuring test scores and teacher
qualifications that stricter licensing requirements in high-income districts increases
quality in both measures. Interestingly, there is no effect in either measure when
examining low-income school districts. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find no effect on the
amount of dental repair needed when licensing requirements are increased, while Holen
(1978) did find an increase in quality when entry requirements were increased. Klee
(2013), Carpenter (2012), and Healey (1973) find no quality improvements when
licensing requirements were increased for accountants, florists, and lab technicians
respectively.
Interstate Mobility
Licensing can be a barrier to interstate mobility due to the fact that licensing
primarily occurs at the state level. New licenses are typically required when a worker
wishes to move across state lines while working in a licensed occupation. The time and
money costs that must be incurred to get a new state license often deters people from
moving. This licensing impact is the most difficult to study due to the complexities of
how the economy affects migration patterns. Research studying the Nurse Licensure
Interstate Compact, which allows licensed nurses to practice in any state participating in
the interstate compact, finds positive effects of the compact’s adoption on interstate
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mobility (DePasquale and Strange 2014). The effects are particularly positive for those
in the northeast where workers are more likely to live near a state border. In analysis
done by the White House occupational licensing report on data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation, the authors conclude that licensed workers are 20
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percent less likely to move across state lines than non-licensed workers (White House
2015).
Research Design and Hypothesis
Data
This analysis uses original time-series licensing data from The Council of State
Governments along with occupational employment data from the Bureau of Labor
statistics (BLS). BLS’ Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program produces
annual employment and wage estimates for over 800 occupations using the standard
occupation code (SOC) classification system. The data can be accessed at the state,
metropolitan area, or nation-wide level. This analysis concentrated on state level data
since most occupational licensing is administered by state regulatory boards. I collected
primary licensing data by looking at the state statutes and administrative regulations
through an online legislative tracking clearinghouse called StateNet. This data was
collected as a part of a larger project, of which I was a researcher for The Council of
State Governments (CSG). CSG collected several data points such as required
education, cost of license, experience or training required, number of exams. For this
analysis, I was only interested in year of initial licensure. This is the year that acquiring a
license for a particular occupation was made mandatory by state statute. CSG collected
licensing data for 34 different occupations. The chosen occupations were selected by
four primary criteria. The occupation must be licensed in at least 30 states, require less
than a Bachelor’s degree, have projected employment growth rate for 2014-2024 at
national average or higher, and must total current employment levels of 10,000 or
greater, resulting in a total of 34 occupations.
I chose massage therapists and electricians for this analysis because these
occupations have more variation in the number of states that license than other
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occupations we collected data for. Massage therapists and electricians are licensed by
43 and 44 states respectively, with some states only recently requiring a license. This is
more variation than nurses, for example, which all 50 states have licensed for many
years. The data needs to have a good mix of licensed vs. non-licensed states in order to
capture any licensing effects that might be taking place.
Variables
The primary independent variable within the data is a dummy variable “licensed”
which indicates whether or not a state licenses an occupation in a given year. My
dependent variables came from the OES data and include total employment and
median hourly wages. Wages for the OES survey are straight-time, gross pay, exclusive
of premium pay for things like overtime, on-call pay, holiday bonuses, severance pay,
etc. The BLS wage estimates are collected annually and are made up of base pay,
commissions, production bonuses, and tips. The OES program began collecting data for
individual occupations in 1997, but changed the way they defined occupations to use
SOC codes in 1999. As a result, my dataset spans from 1999-2016. The BLS houses
OES data for each year in different files. I searched each year’s state-level file by the
SOC code for massage therapists and electricians to obtain that year’s employment and
wage data for each state. I then combined each year’s OES data with the licensing data
from CSG to finalize my dataset.

Design and Hypothesis
This analysis uses two different approaches to study the effect of a state
changing its licensing policy on measurable outcomes. In particular, I study how a state
switching from unlicensed to licensed for certain occupations affects the measurable
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economic outcomes of total employment and hourly median wages. From the dataset,
states were chosen that became licensed from 1999-2016, based on the time range of
the OES data, and compared to control states that do not license the occupation. A
difference-in-difference analysis can naturally be applied studying the treatment groups
who enacted a salient reform and control groups who did not. Rather than doing a
formal regression analysis, simple four-cell difference-in-differences tables will be the
most understandable and useful to explain a potential licensing effect. To formalize
further, here is an example from the dataset. Iowa introduced a license requirement for
electricians in 2007 but Indiana does not have one. I made the four-cell table calculating
average electrician wages in the years prior to 2007 in Iowa, average electrician wages
in the years prior to 2007 in Indiana, average electrician wages in the years 2007 and
after in Iowa, and average electrician wages in the years 2004 and after in Indiana. I
then calculated the difference-in-differences estimator based on the differences
between the states.
As an alternative, and likely more convincing method, I plot wages for the
treatment and control states with hourly median wages the vertical axis and year on the
horizontal axis. Drawing a vertical line at the initial licensure year and plotting the time
series of wages for Iowa and Indiana will show the potential licensing effect. Deviations
from how wages were trending prior to licensure can be attributed to licensing if the
effect is similar across several states. Although this analysis will not test statistical
significance, the magnitude of economic significance will be benchmarked to prior
literature which says that licensing increases wages and decreases employment growth
by 10-15%. Deviations in wage and employment trend lines after licensing greater than
10%, as compared to the control state, will be considered economically significant.
Available data limited the options for choosing treatment and control states. In order to
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capture a potential licensing effect, data needs to be available for multiple years before
and after initial licensure. Because the OES data spans from 1999-2016, this limits my
analysis to states who first began licensing between these years. The control states
were chosen from the list of states who do not license the occupation at all. There are
seven states who do not license massage therapists and six states who do not license
electricians. The list of states who do not license was compared to the list of states who
began licensing between 1999-2016 to generate the comparisons used for this analysis.
States were matched together based on geography and relative population size. It is
important to note that comparing a treatment state to a control state only works if they
are trending in the same direction prior to licensure. The parallel trend assumption
requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference between the compared states
remains constant over time. If they are not trending in the same direction, I will discuss
why the control state is not a good comparison for the treatment state.
The difference-in-difference method removes bias in post-licensing comparisons
between the treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent
differences between those groups, as well as bias from comparisons over time in the
treatment group that could be the result of trends due to other causes of the outcome.
Ultimately this analysis allows me to visually test the null hypothesis that licensing has
no effect on wages in the states that license the occupation. I performed the four-cell
difference-in-differences analysis and graph median hourly wages and total employment
for two different occupations and several sets of states. After visually inspecting the
graphs, I will be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis that licensing has no
effect on wages and employment.
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Results
Electricians
1. Total Employment in Iowa (Licensed 2007) & Indiana (No License)

2. Median Wages in Iowa (Licensed 2007) & Indiana (No License)
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3. Total Employment in Kentucky (Licensed 2001) & Missouri (No License)
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4. Median Wages in Kentucky (Licensed 2001) & Missouri (No License)

5. Total Employment in Massachusetts (Licensed 2007) & New York (No
License)
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6. Median Wages in Massachusetts (Licensed 2007) & New York (No License)

Massage Therapists
7. Total Employment in Illinois (Licensed 2005) & Indiana (No License)
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8. Median Wages in Illinois (Licensed 2005) & Indiana (No License)

9. Total Employment in Nebraska (Licensed 2007) & Kansas (No License)
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10. Median Wages in Nebraska (Licensed 2007) & Kansas (No License)

11. Total Employment in Michigan (Licensed 2009) & Minnesota (No License)
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12. Median Wages in Michigan (Licensed 2009) & Minnesota (No License)

When comparing the time series data plotted for licensed and non-licensed
states, there does not seem to be evidence that a wage premium or employment gap
exist attributable to licensing. The analysis fails to find evidence that an occupation
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becoming licensed has an effect on wages and employment. However as referenced in
the literature review, the ways in which licensing affects these economic outcomes
varies by occupation. Having only analyzed two occupations, I do not believe that we
can apply this result to all occupations generally. There may be a wage premium or
employment gap in other occupations as a result of licensing, but for electricians and
massage therapists such a conclusion cannot be reached.
This null result is more convincing for electricians than massage therapists.
Figures 1 and 2 compare employment and wages Iowa (licensed 2007) and Indiana (no
license). The wage trend lines move almost identically in figure 2, while employment in
Iowa seems to steadily increase year to year, which does not align with the hypothesis.
If licensing restricted employment for electricians in Iowa, we would expect to see the
trend line decrease at a faster rate than Indiana after 2007. Figures 3 and 4 comparing
Kentucky (licensed 2001) and Missouri (no license) show a similar pattern. The trend
line for wages moves almost identically between the two states with only very slight
deviations. One could argue that the employment trend lines do not hold to the parallel
trend assumption, but I think the lines post-licensure move closely enough together that
they are a good fit for comparison. The lines are nearly identical after 2001 with no
visible effect from licensure. Likewise, in figure 6, Massachusetts and New York do not
trend parallel initially. However, starting in 2005 wages do trend parallel and fit very
tightly together even after Massachusetts became licensed in 2007.
These graphs show a convincing null result for electricians. When looking at the
plotted time series data, the trend lines barely changes at all upon initial licensure. If a
licensing effect did exist, we would expect the line to trend upward for wages and
downward for employment after a state licenses electricians. However, when
comparing with the control states that do not license, the trend lines hardly deviates at
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all upon initial licensure. This result is consistent across all three sets of state
comparisons.
The result seems to hold even for an occupation within an entirely different
industry. The trend lines for massage therapists are more erratic, but still does not seem
to support a possible licensing effect. There must be other effects at work causing the
wage and employment lines to shift, but these shifts do not occur in sync with the
treatment state adopting a license requirement. In figure 7 employment is increasing at
a faster rate for Illinois (licensed 2005) than Indiana (no license) which again contradicts
the hypothesis that licensing would restrict employment growth in the licensed state.
Likewise, in figure 8 the wage trend line for Illinois decreases after 2005 while wages
are growing in Indiana. This is the opposite of what should be occurring according to the
hypothesis. Figure 9 shows employment trend lines in Kansas (no license) and
Nebraska (licensed 2007) staying relatively constant to each other. There is a significant
deviation from 2011-2014, with Kansas’ employment increasing by almost 50%,
however 2014 and 2015 show that figure regressing back towards the mean which
shows that this was a temporary spike rather than a lasting increase in employment
growth rate. Figures 10, 11, and 12 all seem to be violating the parallel trend
assumption of difference in difference, and therefore I do not think we can make
definitive comparisons between states. Overall these results are less convincing for
massage therapists, but if a licensing effect was as certain as the literature indicates,
we should see evidence in the graphs. No evidence is present, and therefore I do not
believe we can conclude that such an effect exists for either occupation.
There are sizeable gaps in the data in figures 5, 9, 11, and 12. These gaps are
due to wage or employment estimates not being available for that year or years. I do not
believe these gaps are significant to the conclusion because in each instance there is
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three years worth of data after the gap to analyze how wages were trending prior to
licensure. The gaps in the data occurred far enough before initial licensure that they
should not be significant.
The appendix contains initial four cell difference-in-difference tables. These
tables also indicate that no clear effect exists upon initial licensure. There are no
identifiable patterns among the state comparisons between wages and employment pre
and post licensure. However, these tables are generally only helpful when a clear
pattern does exist. They are almost certainly picking up a lot of unidentifiable noise. This
analysis primarily focuses on the graphs as a better means for identifying a potential
effect.
Discussion
It may be the case that a licensing effect takes many years to be seen. The
increase in wages and decrease in employment could be a slow, gradual process over
the course of many years that eventually restricts entrants into the profession, but does
not do so initially. As discussed in the literature review, when controlling for state and
occupation fixed effects, the licensing wage premium shrinks. Most of these studies
employ very large panel datasets that span 20-30 years. If the wage premium is smaller
than originally theorized, it may be even smaller or even totally negligible within the first
few years of initial licensure.
Perhaps it is also the case that the licensing requirements adopted are not
severe enough to deter an aspiring practitioner from entering the occupation.
Electricians
States
Iowa
Kentucky
Massachusetts

Experience

No. Of
Exams

Length of
Renewal

Continuing
Education

Initial Renewal
Cost
Cost

16000, h

1

3

18

75

75

4, y

1

1

6

150

50

8000, h

1

3

45

330

104
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Massage Therapists
States

Training
Hours

No. Of
Exams

Length of
Renewal

Continuing
Education

Initial
Cost

Renewal
Cost

Illinois

600

1

2

48

370

87.5

Michigan

500

1

3

54

290

115

Nebraska

1000

1

2

24

322

127

The above tables outline the licensing requirements for electricians and massage
therapist in each treatment state where a license was adopted. Based on the previous
literature, if a licensing effect did exist for these occupations, you would expect the
effect to be even more noticeable in the graphs for Nebraska and Iowa. The training and
experience requirements for these two states are double the requirements for the other
states who also recently adopted a license. It is important to note a significant difference
between these two occupations. The fact that an electricians license requires
experience hours means that the non-licensed worker can still perform the duties of an
electrician as an apprentice. They are still earning money and working as an electrician
underneath a someone with a license. Hence the licensed is not necessarily a barrier to
enter the occupation, but a barrier to upward mobility within the occupation. A massage
therapy license requires training hours from an approved training program. These hours
are different from experience because they are instructional hours that take place in a
school and not in an actual work setting. The aspiring massage therapist is statutorily
forbidden to perform the duties of a massage therapist without these training hours.
Therefore, in this instance the license is a barrier to enter the occupation. This
distinction is important particularly for electricians. It could be the case that these
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licensing requirements do not restrict employment or deter entry into the occupation
because the requirements can be achieved over time while still practicing in the
profession. I still initially expected the requirements for massage therapist to be severe
enough to deter entry although the analysis did show that to be the case.
Another possible reason for this result is a violation of the difference-in-difference
assumption that there are no confounding policies or spillover effects from events
outside of licensure that are affecting these figures. One major economic shock that
certainly impacted wages and employment nationwide was the great recession of the
late 2000s. Having treatment and control states helps to control for the recession effects
consistent across all states, but some states were hit harder and took longer to recover.
Spillover effects from the recession are likely captured in the graphs, and could lead to
false conclusions. A state like Michigan, for example, saw a steep drop in employment
for massage therapist around the time where regulation began. However this also
coincided with the years of the recession where Michigan’s state economy was hit
particularly hard due failures in the automotive industry. The spillover from those effects
are likely captured within the graphs. However the consistency of the trend lines across
state comparisons, particularly among electricians, leads me to believe that state
recession spillover effects are not effecting the results.
This null result is important to policy makers who are always looking to grow
their state’s economy. Occupational licensing reform has been a workforce priority of
the two most recent presidential administrations with President Obama’s administration
releasing a 76-page policy framework for state officials, and the Trump administration
awarding large grants for state occupational licensing reform. However, if the result of a
state licensing a certain occupation is negligible, policymakers should focus their efforts
elsewhere when figuring out how to grow their state economies. Arguments from
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publicized reports from the Institute of Justice and the Obama Administration say that
removing these licensing barriers will result in an influx of new practitioners into the
occupation which will stimulate job growth. The evidence from this analysis does not
show that this would be the case. This analysis finds no evidence that licensing effects
wages or total employment in any visible way. If an occupation becoming licensed does
not affect wages or employment, then deregulating an occupation likely won’t affect
these outcomes either. BLS studied the history of states de-licensing occupations, and
found there have only been eight instances where a state completely removed a
requirement for licensure (Thornton and Timmons 2015). One of these instances was
private investigators in Colorado who made acquiring a license a voluntary activity in
2011.

As this figure indicates, when compared with Utah who has licensed private
investigators since 1995, there does not seem to be a drastic change in employment
after the private investigator’s license became voluntary in 2011. Colorado saw peak
employment of private investigators in 2007 while the occupation was still regulated. It
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would not make sense to conclude that removing the licensing requirement resulted in a
new influx of workers. The increase from 2011 to 2015 seems to be more due to
postrecession regression to the mean rather than a result of the occupation being
delicensed.
Limitations
The most significant limitation in this analysis is the number of years where data
was able to be retrieved. Due to changes in the standard occupation classification
system, data was only collected from 1999-2016. As speculated in the section above,
wage premiums and employment shifts due to licensing could take many years to be
seen in a state’s economy. Ideally this analysis could be done with 30-40 years of data
to see how wages and employment trend for several decades after an occupation
becomes licensed. This also limits the number of occupations and state comparisons
available for analysis. To have proper treatment and control states, the data must have
a mix of states who began licensing after 1999 licensed vs. non-licensed states. With
more years available, the analysis would be able to include occupations where states
primarily began licensing it before 1999. Perhaps the wage and employment trends
would look differently in these occupations that have been licensed for longer amounts
of time. Expanding the analysis to include more occupations and more state
comparisons would strengthen the results.
Expanding the research to include more occupations is particularly important for
policymakers who wish to enact salient licensing reform. Electricians and massage
therapists are occupations that fit the methodological needs of this analysis, however
the employment levels for these occupations as a percentage of the total labor force is
small. If a policy maker were interested in licensing reform that would be felt by a
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greater percentage of practitioners, he would likely choose occupations such as nurses
or teachers which are have both been highly regulated for many years. Reforming
licensing among these occupations would be felt more than reform among electricians
and massage therapists.
Lastly this analysis does not employ any formal statistical methods. I did not set a
level of statistical significance for the results, and did not produce standard errors.
However, given the analysis finds zero licensing effect, this is not important. The clear
and transparent results the methods of this analysis provide is more valuable to a
policymaker than complex regression techniques that produce standard errors. The
economic significance of this analysis is equally important for policy analysis. On
economic significance grounds, the evidence of this analysis is clear that the licensing
effects are not meaningfully significant because they are not visible and consistent
across the state comparisons.
Conclusions
The findings of this research fail conclude that a wage premium or employment
gap exist when comparing licensed vs non-licensed states for electricians and massage
therapists. When graphing trend lines for total employment and median wages in
treatment and control states, there seems to be no apparent change attributable to a
state adopting a license. This result is contrary to the hypothesis and does not generally
agree with the research which says that licensing premiums increase wages by 10-15%
and slows employment growth rates in licensed states. Licensing has recently been a
trendy topic for policymakers, however this analysis does not find evidence that more
government regulation for certain occupations will have any significant impact on wage
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or employment growth for state economies. Future research should include more
occupations and longer time series in order to strengthen these results.

Appendix
Electricians

Indiana (No License)
Iowa (Licensed 2007)

Average Pre 2007
Median Wages
23.04
18.54
-4.51

Average Post 2007
Median Wages
26.76
22.96
-3.80

Licensing
Effect

0.71
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Dif-in-dif estimator

Indiana (No License)
Iowa (Licensed 2007) Dif-indif estimator

Missouri (No License)
Kentucky (Licensed
2001)
Dif-in-dif estimator

Missouri (No License)
Kentucky (Licensed
2001)
Dif-in-dif estimator

New York (No License)
Massachusetts (Licensed
2007)
Dif-in-dif estimator

New York (No License)
Massachusetts (Licensed
2007)
Dif-in-dif estimator

Average Pre 2007
Employment

Average Post 2007
Employment

15423.75
6151.25
-9272.50

14231.00
6956.00
-7275.00

Average Pre 2001
Median Wages
22.24

Average Post 2001
Median Wages
26.01

17.10
-5.14
Average Pre 2001
Employment
12580.00

20.42
-5.59
Average Post 2001
Employment
10891.88

9650.00
-2930.00

8108.13
-2783.75

1997.50
Licensing
Effect

-0.45

146.25

Average Pre 2007
Median Wages
26.27

Average Post 2007 Licensing Median
Wages
Effect
30.72

23.79
-2.48
Average Pre 2007
Employment
39968.57

28.47
-2.25
Average Post 2007
Employment
36356.00

13111.25
-26857.32

12949.00
-23407.00

Average Pre 2005
Median Wages
14.59

Average Post 2005
Median Wages
13.40

15.48
0.89
Average Pre 05
Employment
893.33

14.45
1.05
Average Post 05
Employment
1010.00

0.23

3450.32

Massage Therapists

Indiana (No License)
Iliinois (Licensed 2005)
Dif-in-dif estimator

Indiana (No License)

Licensing
Effect

0.16
Licensing
Effect
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3018.33
2125.00

3285.00
2275.00

Average Pre 2007
Median Wages
Kansas (No license)
12.79
Nebraska (Licensed 2007)
12.00
Dif-in-dif estimator
-0.79
Average Pre 2007
Employment
Kansas (No license)
356.67
80.00
Nebraska (Licensed 2007) Difin-dif estimator
-276.67

Average Post 2007
Median Wages
14.86
13.28
-1.58
Average Post 2007
Employment
558.89
358.89
-200.00

Licensing
Effect

Average Pre 2009
Median Wages
18.83
13.40
-5.44
Average Pre 2009
Employment
733.75
1050.00
316.25

Average Post 2009
Median Wages
19.17
17.43
-1.74
Average Post 2009
Employment
2008.57
1757.14
-251.43

Licensing
Effect

Iliinois (Licensed 2005)
Dif-in-dif estimator

Minnesota (No License)
Michigan (Licensed 2009)
Dif-in-dif estimator

Minnesota (No License)
Michigan (Licensed 2009) Difin-dif estimator

150.00

-0.79
Licensing
Effect

76.67

3.70
Licensing
Effect

-567.68
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